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A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE





According to the United States Sentencing Commission, drug
trafficking offenses constitute roughly forty percent of all federal
criminal prosecutions.' The majority of defendants who commit
such offenses will be sentenced under section 2D1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 2 Unlike pre-guidelines sentencing prac-
tices, 3 section 2D1.1 sentences are based upon the total weight of
the controlled substance possessed by a particular offender. As a
result, drug traffickers who deal in larger quantities of controlled
substances should theoretically receive longer prison sentences.
4
However, the total weight is not necessarily based on the quan-
tity of the pure substance. A footnote to the Drug Quantity Table in
section 2D1.1 states that " [u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of
a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire
1 Thirteen thousand, four hundred and thirty-seven offenders were sentenced
under the drug distribution and trafficking provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines between Oct. 1, 1990 and Sept. 1, 1991, which represented 40.7% of all reported
Guidelines sentences for that period. By comparison, of the other 31 primary offense
categories listed by the United States Sentencing Commission, only sentences for fraud
comprised more than an additional 10% of all reported sentences. UNITED STATES SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT (1991).
2 Section 2DI.1 is entitled "Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or
Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses)." UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1992).
3 See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-guidelines sen-
tencing practices.
4 See Ronnie Scotkin, The Development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Drug Traf-
ficking Offenses, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 51-53 (1990).
THOMASJ. MEIER
weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of the controlled substance."
5
Although the foregoing language appears straightforward, the
federal courts have applied section 2D 1.1 inconsistently when deter-
mining which combinations of drugs and other materials constitute
a "mixture or substance." This confusion has resulted in part from
the failure of the Commission, Congress, and the Supreme Court to
articulate clear principles to guide lower federal courts. This Com-
ment suggests that current federal court interpretations of "mixture
or substance" are inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the
Sentencing Guidelines because the interpretations do not ade-
quately relate drug offender punishments to criminal culpability and
because they promote disparate sentencing practices.
Part II sets forth the basic goals Congress directed the Commis-
sion to achieve in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines. This
section also discusses the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,6 which pro-
vided the framework for the Commission's final draft of section
2D 1.1. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court's definition of "mix-
ture" as applied to LSD and blotter paper in Chapman v. United
States.7 Part IV criticizes the Court's approach and discusses con-
flicting lower federal court applications of the Chapman decision. Fi-
nally, Part V proposes a revision of the drug offender sentencing
provisions in light of the failure of the current provisions to provide
the just, uniform, and proportional sentencing scheme envisioned
by Congress.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 21 U.S.C. § 841
This section briefly summarizes the concerns which led to the
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and sets forth the
basic goals Congress sought to achieve through the promulgation of
the Sentencing Guidelines.8 Next, this section discusses the drug
offender provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841, and their influence on the
final draft of U.S.S.G. section 2DI.1. This section concludes that
the "mixture or substance" language contained in both § 841 and
section 2DI.1 has not been adequately defined by Congress or the
Sentencing Commission.
5 U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.i(c). The footnote tracks the language in 21 U.S.C. § 841 upon
which the drug offender portion of the Sentencing Guidelines is based. See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
6 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
7 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1925-1927 (1991).
8 For a thorough discussion of the topic, see Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80J. CGRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1990).
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A. THE GOALS OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19849 was enacted to "enhance
the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an
effective, fair sentencing system."' 0 The far reaching reforms initi-
ated by Congress replaced the then-existing federal sentencing sys-
tem with a more structured scheme designed to channel judicial
discretion."
Under the pre-guidelines system, federal judges enjoyed broad
discretion to sentence offenders within wide penalty ranges estab-
lished by Congress. 12 Furthermore, a sentence, once imposed,
could only be reviewed by an appellate court for abuse of discre-
tion.13 Finally, a parole board determined the actual portion of a
sentence that an offender would serve in prison.14
The pre-guidelines system was designed to promote individual-
ized sentencing. However, empirical studies suggested that individ-
ualized sentencing resulted in widespread disparity-similarly
situated defendants received widely different sentences. For in-
stance, a statistical survey in the Second Circuit revealed that
sentences imposed in almost identical cases ranged from three years
to twenty years imprisonment.15 The Commission itself found sen-
tencing disparities attributable to race, sex, and region in which the
defendant was convicted.' 6 In addition, the public became increas-
9 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was passed as Chapter II of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-437, §§ 211-39, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
10 U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment.
I I See Nagel, supra note 8, at 883-84.
12 See Theresa Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Con-
gressional Goals: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 393-94 (1991).
'3 Id.
14 Id.
15 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (citing Anthony Partridge & William B.
Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the Judges, 1-3 (1974)). See also
Kevin Clancy et al., Sentencing Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent
and Sources of Sentencing Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 551-53 (1981) (re-
porting results of national survey of federal judges and concluding "[d]isparity is wide-
spread"); William Austin & Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges' Responses to
Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
306, 306-10 (1977) ("[T]he five [hypothetical] cases [presented to forty-seven Virginia
district court judges] produced a variety of patterns of disparity, but some form of dis-
parity was always present."). Judge Marvin Frankel, an outspoken critic of the pre-guid-
lines system, stated: "The evidence is conclusive that judges .. ., administering statutes
that confer huge measures of discretion, mete out widely divergent sentences ... ex-
plainable only by the variations amongjudges." Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentenc-
ing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1973).
16 See Breyer, supra note 15, at 4 (citing Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings on Sentencing
379
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ingly dissatisfied with the perceived dishonesty of a system in which
the sentence imposed was rarely served as the result of parole.' 7 In
response to such criticism, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 ("Reform Act").' 8
The main goal of the Reform Act was to channel judicial discre-
tion with a highly structured sentencing scheme designed to pro-
mote honesty,' 9 uniformity, and proportionality20 in sentencing.21
To promote honesty, Congress eliminated the parole system for
federal prisoners sentenced after the Guidelines' effective date. As a
result, the sentence imposed by the court is now the sentence served
in prison, less approximately fifteen percent for good behavior. 22
To promote uniformity and proportionality, the Reform Act es-
tablished the Federal Sentencing Commission to promulgate de-
tailed sentencing guidelines which judges must follow when
imposing sentences. 23 Federal judges currently retain limited au-
thority to sentence outside the prescribed Guidelines range, and
may do so only upon finding "aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission." 24  Moreover, a judge must
support his or her reason for such a departure in writing, and all
sentences are reviewable for conformity with the law, rather than
Guidelines Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee of the judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Ilene H. Nagel, U.S. Sentencing
Commissioner).
17 See Breyer, supra note 15, at 4; Karle & Sager, supra note 12, at 394; Nagel, supra
note 8, at 884. See also BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1987, 142-43 (Katherine M. Jamieson & Timothy J.
Flanagan eds., 1988).
18 Karle & Sager, supra note 12, at 393.
19 "By 'honesty' Congress meant to end the previous system whereby a judge might
sentence an offender to twelve years, but the Parole Commission could release him after
four." Breyer, supra note 15, at 4.
20 By "uniformity" and "proportionality," Congress meant "to reduce 'unjustifiably
wide' sentencing disparity." Id.
21 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch.l, Pt.A(3), in-
tro. comment (Nov. 1992).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro, com-
ment. The Parole Board was scheduled to be phased out within five years after the
adoption of the guidelines and all prisoners sentenced under the pre-Guidelines system
were to be assigned specific terms of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b)(1), (3) (1988).
23 "The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judi-
cial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members. Its princi-
pal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal
justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines
prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes."
U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro, comment.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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abuse of discretion.2
5
The Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual dearly docu-
ments the goals Congress directed the Commission to achieve.2 6
For instance, the Statutory Mission section states:
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984... provides for the development
of guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punish-
ment: deterrence, incapacitationjust punishment, and rehabilitation. The
Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rational-
ize the federal sentencing process. 27
In addition, the Policy Statement recognizes that:
Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the
wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses com-
mitted by similar offenders. [Congress also] sought proportionality in
sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.28
Congress also enacted a number of specific directives to further
guide the Commission's drafting discretion. 29 For instance, statutes
instruct the Commission to take into account the nature and degree
of harm caused by the offense, community views and concerns about
the gravity of the offense, and aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances, in establishing offense categories.30 These directives also
state that the nature and capacity of correctional facilities and serv-
ices must be considered.31 Finally, the maximum range of imprison-
ment for each sentencing category must not exceed the minimum by
more than twenty-five percent.3 2
The Commission responded to the statutory directives by creat-
ing a generic sentencing table containing forty-three vertical offense
levels and six horizontal criminal history levels.3 3 Every federal of-
fense is assigned a base offense level ranging from level 1, the light-
est sentence, to level 43, the most severe. Similar offenses are
grouped into generic categories and all offenders sentenced under
the same offense category receive the same base offense level.3 4
The base offense level must be increased in exactly the same man-
ner when "specific offense characteristics," such as possession of a
25 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b), (e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
26 U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro, comment.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 902-05 for a summary of the directives.
30 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (1988).
31 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988).
32 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
33 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table
(Nov. 1992).
34 Nagel, supra note 8, at 923.
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firearm, are involved.3 5 Clear rules establish an offender's criminal
history.3 6 Finally, any departure from the range prescribed at the
point on the grid where the offense level and criminal history cate-
gories intersect must be supported in writing by the sentencing
judge.
37
B. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON U.S.S.G. SECTION 2D1.1
While the Commission drafted its initial Sentencing Guidelines,
Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("Drug Abuse
Act").38 The Drug Abuse Act limited the Commission's authority
regarding drug trafficking offenses by establishing five- and ten-year
mandatory minimum sentences for offenders trafficking in specified
weights of heroin, cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, LSD, and
marijuana.3 9
The House Judiciary Committee endorsed the Drug Abuse Act
as punishment for "major traffickers . . . who are responsible for
creating and delivering large quantities of drugs." 40 A second level
of focus was placed on managers at the retail level who deal in sub-
35 Id.
36 Id. at 934.
37 Id. The following hypothetical case illustrates how the Sentencing Guidelines
work in practice:
A drug trafficker, with one serious prior conviction (i.e. a sentence of imprison-
ment exceeding thirteen months), is caught in possession of a firearm and 5 kilo-
grams of cocaine mixed with the cutting agent mannitol. The sentencing judge
would proceed as follows:
1. Look up the statute of conviction in the statutory index. The index will direct
the judge to U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I.
2. Find the base offense level. The drug quantity table assigns trafficking in "at
least 5 KG but less than 15 KG" of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine a base offense level of 32. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6).
3. Add "specific offense characteristics." Possession of a firearm in this case in-
creases the base offense level by two levels (32 to 34). U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b).
4. Determine if any "adjustments" from Chapter 3 of the Guidelines apply. The
base offense level may be adjusted in this case for the defendant's role in the of-
fense, efforts to obstruct justice, or acceptance of responsibility. See generally
U.S.S.G. Ch.3.
5. Calculate the criminal history score from the offender's past conviction record.
Here, U.S.S.G. § 4AI.l assigns three points for one prior serious conviction.
6. Refer to the Sentencing Table to determine the offender's sentence. Here, an
offense level of "34" combined with "3 criminal history points" yields a range of
168-210 months in prison.
7. Impose the Guidelines sentence or impose a non-Guidelines sentence if special
factors are present. In this case, the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) impose
a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence that the judge cannot reduce.
This hypothetical was adapted from Breyer, supra note 15, at 6-7.
38 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991)).
39 Scotkin, supra note 4, at 52-53.
40 H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986).
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stantial "street quantities" of drugs. 4' In order to punish these high
volume dealers, Congress decided to base mandatory minimum
sentences on quantities of drugs which the Committee felt would
likely be possessed by high level drug traffickers. 42
The Committee further decided that the quantities necessary to
trigger the mandatory minimum sentences should "not necessarily
[be] quantities of pure substance," but should include "mixtures,
compounds, or preparations that contain a detectable amount of [a]
drug."'43 As a result of the Committee's "market-oriented ap-
proach," drug quantities are not generally related "to the number of
doses of the drug.., in a given sample. The quantity is based on
the minimum [total weight of drugs] that might be controlled... by
a trafficker in a high place in the ... distribution chain." 44
The Commission responded to the passage of the Drug Abuse
Act by adopting as reference points for the development of its drug
trafficking offense guideline, the quantities of the controlled sub-
stances specified by Congress as necessary to trigger the five and
ten-year mandatory minimum sentences.45 The ten-year mandatory
minimum offenses listed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) were assigned
offense level 32, and the five-year mandatory minimum offenses
listed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) were assigned offense level 26.46
The quantities necessary to trigger base offense levels from 6 to 42
were then adjusted upward and downward to reflect trafficking in
larger or smaller quantities of the controlled substances listed in




44 Id. The imposition of mandatory minimum sentences based not only on the
weight of the pure drug, but also on mixtures or substances containing a detectable
amount of the drug, represents a recent development in Congress. For example, Con-
gress did not base punishments on the quantity of the drug distributed until 1984. See
The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2068. Even then, the Act based penalties only upon the weight of the pure drug.
Id. Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary Report accompanying the Reform Act of 1984
stated that -[t]he Committee generally looks with disfavor on statutory minimum
sentences . . ., since their inflexibility occasionally results in too harsh an application of
the law." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 n.194 (1983).
45 Scotkin, supra note 4, at 53.
46 Id. at 54. The offense levels correspond to guideline ranges of 121-151 months
and 63-78 months, respectively, for defendants in criminal history category I. See
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table (Nov.
1992).
47 Scotkin, supra note 4, at 54. To illustrate the point, § 841 (1)(A) imposes a ten year
mandatory minimum sentence for possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine.
U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1(c)(6) assigns a base offense level of 32 to possession of"[a]t least 5 KG
but less than 15 KG of Cocaine." The Sentencing Table mandates a sentence of 121-
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Although Congress used the phrase "mixture or substance con-
taining a detectable amount" throughout § 841 (b) as a basis for cal-
culating the quantity of controlled substances, Congress failed to
provide a clear definition for the phrase "mixture or substance."'48
The Sentencing Commission likewise declined to clarify the phrase's
meaning. Instead, the Guidelines simply state that a " '[m]ixture or
[s]ubstance' as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21
U.S.C. § 841." 49 Therefore, Congress and the Sentencing Commis-
sion have left the courts with the difficult task of deciding which
drug combinations should be considered "mixtures or substances"
for sentencing purposes. The following sections illustrate that the
federal courts have ineffectively resolved the meaning of this unde-
fined phrase.
III. CHAPMAA V. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF "MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE"
A. BACKGROUND
In Chapman v. United States,50 the petitioners/defendants were
convicted of selling ten sheets of blotter paper containing 1000
doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a). 51 Although the weight of the pure LSD was only about
fifty milligrams, the district court combined the weight of the LSD
and the blotter paper in calculating the petitioners' sentences. The
total combined weight of 5.7 grams resulted in the imposition
of the mandatory five year minimum sentence required by
§ 841 (b) (1) (B) (v) for distributing "more than one gram of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of LSD. ' ' 52 The Sev-
enth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the sentence imposed by the
district court in a five to four decision.53
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioners
151 months (10.1 to 12.7 years) for offense level 32. Higher or lower base offense levels
are assigned to trafficking in less than five kilograms or more than fifteen kilograms of
cocaine.
48 The words are neither defined in the statute itself nor by its legislative history. See
generally 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1986).
49 U.S.S.G. § 2DIl, comment (n.l).
50 1l1 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
51 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988), provides: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally-(I) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ... 
52 Chapman, Il1 S. Ct. at 1922.
53 Marshall v. United States, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), aff dsub nom. Chapman v.
United States, I1I S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
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argued that blotter paper is only a carrier medium and that § 841
does not require the weight of a carrier medium to be included
when calculating a sentence for LSD distribution. 54 As LSD is gen-
erally sold by dose rather than weight, the petitioners asserted that
including the weight of the blotter paper would produce anomalous
sentences based on the weight of the blotter paper instead of the
actual amount of LSD. The petitioners urged the Court not to con-
strue the ambiguous words "mixture or substance" to reach such an
illogical result. Alternatively, the petitioners argued that the inclu-
sion of carrier mediums such as LSD would violate the equal protec-
tion or due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
55
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The
Court rejected the petitioners' arguments and affirmed their
sentences. In response to the petitioners' first argument, the Court
began by analyzing the structure of § 841. The Court noted that the
Act imposes mandatory minimum sentences for distribution of spec-
ified weights of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount" of drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and LSD. 56 However,
with respect to PCP or methamphetamine, mandatory minimum
sentences may be based either on the weight of a "mixture or sub-
stance" or on the lower weight of the pure drug.57 The Court there-
fore concluded that "Congress knew how to indicate that the weight
of the pure drug was to be used to determine sentence, and [inten-
tionally decided] not [to] make that distinction with respect to
LSD."58
The Court supported its conclusion by referring to the Drug
Abuse Act's legislative history:
Congress adopted a "market oriented" approach to punishing drug
trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather
that the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length
of the sentence .... Congress did not want to punish retail traffickers
less severely, even though they deal in smaller quantities of the pure
drug, because such traffickers keep the street markets going.59
The Court then held that LSD applied to blotter paper was in
fact a "mixture or substance" under § 841 and section 2D1.1. 60
54 Chapman, 1 II S. Ct. at 1923.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1924.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1925.
60 Id.
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Noting that neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines de-
fined the terms "mixture or substance," the Court adopted a
mechanical, dictionary meaning of "mixture." 61 Mixture was de-
fined as matter consisting of two or more substances that are so
thoroughly blended together that the particles of one are diffused
among the particles of the other but nonetheless maintain a sepa-
rate existence. 6
2
The Court applied its definition of "mixture" to blotter paper
and LSD as follows:
The LSD crystals are [diffused among the fibers of paper], so that they
are commingled with it, but the LSD does not chemically combine with
the paper. Thus, it retains a separate existence .... Like heroin or
cocaine mixed with cutting agents, the LSD cannot be distinguished
from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it. Like cutting
agents used with other drugs that are ingested, the blotter paper, gel,
or sugar cube carrying LSD can be ... ingested with the drug.
63
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that such a defini-
tion could include carriers like a glass vial or an automobile:
The term does not include LSD in a bottle, or LSD in a car, because
the drug is easily distinguished from, and separated from, such a
"container." The drug is clearly not mixed with a glass vial or an auto-
mobile .... It may be true that the weights of containers and packag-
ing materials generally are not included in determining a sentence for
drug distribution, but that is because those items are also clearly not
mixed or otherwise combined with the drug.64
The Court also rejected petitioners' claim that the language was
at least ambiguous and should be interpreted in their favor on the
basis of the rule of lenity.65 The majority concluded that the rule of
lenity was not applicable because the Court's straightforward read-
ing of the structure and language of the statute and the Guidelines
was neither ambiguous nor "absurd or glaringly unjust." 66 There-
fore, the Court held that "the blotter paper used in this case, and
blotter paper customarily used to distribute LSD, is a 'mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of LSD.' "67
61 Id. at 1926.
62 Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1449 (1986); Ox-




65 If a court encounters a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and
structure of an Act," the court may, under the rule of lenity, choose to interpret the Act
most favorably to the defendant so as to avoid an "absurd or glaringly unjust" result. Id.
(citations omitted).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1925.
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Next, the Court dismissed the petitioners' constitutional objec-
tions to the inclusion of blotter paper for sentencing purposes. The
Court stated that once a defendant has been duly convicted, the sen-
tencing judge may impose whatever penalty is authorized by Con-
gress without violating the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, so long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary
distinction. 68
The majority decided that Congress' decision to link distribu-
tion penalties to the "street weight" of drugs in the diluted form in
which they are sold, regardless of purity, was not arbitrary, but was
rationally related to the legitimate goal of punishing large volume
dealers more severely. 69 With respect to LSD, the majority noted
blotter paper facilitates the distribution of the drug by making it eas-
ier to transport, conceal, and sell. Thus, it was rational for Congress
to base penalties upon the chosen tool of LSD traffickers. 70
The Court also noted that the blotter paper used by the peti-
tioners is indeed the carrier of choice, and that therefore including
the weight of blotter paper in the "mixture or substance" for pur-
poses of sentencing would in fact punish those who sell larger
amounts of LSD more heavily. 7' Moreover, the majority decided
that the penalty scheme for LSD distribution would be constitu-
tional even if distributors with varying degrees of culpability were
subject to the same sentence, because "Congress has the power to
define criminal punishments without giving the courts any... dis-
cretion."' 72 In conclusion, the majority held that "the statute re-
quires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when
determining the appropriate sentence for trafficking in LSD, and
this construction is neither a violation of due process, nor unconsti-
tutionally vague." 7
3
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens, in dissent, interpreted "mixture or substance"
within the broader framework and goals of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, instead of focusing narrowly on the language and struc-
ture of § 841(b). 74 He rejected the majority's construction of the
68 Id. at 1927-28.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1928.
71 Id. The Court did note, however, that LSD distributors could always choose to
minimize their sentences by selecting lighter carriers (such as blotter paper) rather than
heavy carriers (such as suger cubes). Id. at 1928 n.6.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1929.
74 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined injustice Stevens' dissent. Id.
387
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statute which, in his opinion, would produce anomalous sentences
and thereby "undermine the very uniformity that Congress sought
to achieve when it adopted the Sentencing Guidelines."
'75
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens believed the plain meaning
of neither "mixture" nor "substance" encompassed the combina-
tion of LSD and blotter paper.76 Justice Stevens noted that the leg-
islative history was not entirely clear and that no mention of the
weight of LSD arose in the debates preceding the passage of the
Drug Abuse Act.77 Therefore, he disagreed with the majority that
the Court was bound by the "plain meaning" and intent of
Congress.
78
Relying on a chart reproduced in the majority opinion, 79justice
Stevens went on to conclude "widely divergent sentences may be
imposed for the sale of identical amounts of [LSD] simply because
of the nature of the carrier." 80 He maintained that "[i]nstead of
punishing more severely those who sell large quantities of LSD, the
Court would punish more severely those who sell small quantities of
LSD in weighty carriers." 81 As a result, Justice Stevens asserted that
the majority approach would lead to disparate sentencing practices,
thereby frustrating the Sentencing Guidelines' goal of uniformity.
Because he refused to construe § 841 "to undermine the very goals
that Congress sought to achieve,"'8 2 Justice Stevens therefore con-
cluded that only the pure LSD should be weighed for sentencing
purposes. 83
IV. A CRITICISM OF THE CHAPMAT INTERPRETATION
This section argues that the Chapman court's literal construction
of "mixture or substance" undermines the goals Congress sought to
achieve in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines.8 4 First, this sec-
75 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 d. at 1931 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 See infra note 99 for a reproduction of the chart.
80 Id. at 1932 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1934 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 See supra part II.A. Although it may be argued that the intent of the Anti-drug
Abuse Act of 1986, passed two years after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, super-
sedes the 1984 Act, and therefore should not be read in light of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the argument is not persuasive. Like the great majority of federal criminal
statutes, the provisions of the Drug Abuse Act have been incorporated into the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
Statutory Appendix (Nov. 1992). Since Congress nowhere explicitly or implicitly states
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tion notes that the statutory scheme, as interpreted by the Court,
does not relate the punishment of LSD offenders to criminal culpa-
bility and therefore does not provide ajust and uniform punishment
to drug offenders.8 5 Second, this section argues that the scheme
will result in disparate, rather than uniform and proportional sen-
tencing practices.8 6 Finally, this section demonstrates that the
Court's approach has created interpretational conflicts among lower
federal courts.87
A. THE COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RELATE LSD PUNISHMENTS TO
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
Although the Chapman majority correctly concluded that Con-
gress is not constitutionally compelled to base punishments upon
individual degrees of culpability,8 8 the structure and legislative his-
tory of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 both indicate that Con-
gress did indeed intend to relate the sentences of drug traffickers to
culpability. 89 This section begins by analyzing Congress' concep-
tion of criminal culpability to show that the Court's classification of
LSD and blotter paper as a mixture fails to relate LSD punishments
to criminal culpability as defined by Congress. As a result, LSD of-
fenders will not receive the just punishments Congress envisioned
when it approved the Sentencing Guidelines.
As mentioned in Part II.B, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act to punish high volume drug traffickers. 90 Congress'
adoption of the mixture or substance method of calculating the
quantity of a drug necessary to trigger the five and ten-year
mandatory minimum sentences "reflected a conscious decision to
mete out heavy punishment to large retail dealers, who are likely to
possess 'substantial street quantities' of the diluted drug ready for
that the provisions of the Drug Abuse Act should not be read in light of the Sentencing
Guidelines, it makes little sense to interpret this particular act differently than every
other criminal statute incorporated into the Guidelines. See generally H.R. Rep. 845, 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). Therefore, it seems more likely that Congress was not aware
that the provisions of the Act would be interpreted to undermine the goals of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
85 "Just punishment" is a goal of the Sentencing Guidelines. See supra notes 27-28
and accompanying text.
86 "Proportional" sentences are a goal of the Sentencing Guidelines. See supra notes
27-28 and accompanying text.
87 "Uniformity" is a goal of the Sentencing Guidelines. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
88 Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1928 (1991).
89 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
90 See H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10-13 (1986).
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sale." 91 As the structure and legislative history of the Act generally
disregard the purity of a controlled substance, 92 an offender who
sells a large quantity of a highly diluted drug is more culpable under
Congress' approach than an offender who sells a small quantity of a
purer form of the drug, even if both sell the same quantity of the
pure substance. The former is more culpable because he or she has
a larger quantity of street market level drug to sell and therefore
"keeps the street markets going" longer.93
The Court's decision in Chapman to define LSD and blotter pa-
per as a "mixture" fails to link sentences for LSD offenders to Con-
gress' definition of culpability. Blotter paper does not, like the
cutting agents typically mixed with heroin and cocaine, dilute pure
LSD to increase the number of consumers to whom LSD can be sold
at the street level. A typical dose of pure LSD weighs about 0.05
milligrams. 94 Although the dosage may vary depending upon the
concentration of LSD applied to the blotter paper or the size of the
squares of the blotter paper, the weight of the blotter paper itself
has no effect on the dosage.95 Blotter paper simply facilitates the
distribution of a dose of LSD in an easily transportable, marketable,
and consumable form. 96 As a result, whether one dose of LSD is
consumed in pure liquid form, on a sugar cube, or on blotter paper,
91 Michelle R. Kallam, Note, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime: State v. Newton, Chap-
man v. United States, and the Problem of Purity and Prosecutions, 52 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1279
(1992).
92 See H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 11-12 (1986).
93 Id.
94 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2DI.I (Nov.
1992).
95 Id. The Chapman majority itself explains:
Pure LSD is dissolved in a solvent such as alcohol, and either the solution is sprayed
on paper or gelatin, or paper is dipped in the solution. The solvent evaporates,
leaving minute amounts of LSD trapped in the paper or gel. Then the paper or gel
is cut into 'one dose' squares and sold by the dose. Users either swallow the
squares, lick them until the drug is released, or drop them into a beverage, thereby
releasing the drug.
Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1923 (1991).
In fact, if the squares of blotter paper are intentionally cut smaller than normal in
order to reduce the dosage and increase the number of consumers to whom the drug
can be sold, the weight of the entire sheet of blotter paper will not change. Further-
more, the weight of each individual dose will be lighter because less blotter paper will be
involved. Thus, Congress' goal of punishing dealers who sell greater amounts of drugs
by diluting their purity will be frustrated because the LSD mixture will weigh less. By
contrast, diluting the purity of cocaine with a cutting agent to increase the amount of
cocaine available to sell does increase the weight of the entire mixture. A cocaine traf-
ficker dealing in large quanitites of highly dilute cocaine will therefore be punished more
severely than a trafficker dealing with the same amount of cocaine in a purer form.
96 Kallam, supra note 91, at 1279-80.
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it is still only one dose.9
7
As an illustration, the petitioners in Chapman were convicted of
selling 1000 doses of LSD on blotter paper.98 Since LSD is sold by
the dose at the street market level, petitioners had the ability to en-
gage in 1000 drug transactions with street market consumers. If
they had elected to sell 1000 doses on sugar cubes, the weight of the
mixture would have drastically increased for sentencing purposes.
If they had elected to sell 1000 doses in pure form, the weight would
have drastically decreased. However, in all three cases, the number
of consumers to whom the mixture could be sold remained constant
because the same 1000 doses were involved.99 As the number of
potential consumers was not increased because the petitioners
elected to sell their LSD on blotter paper instead of on sugar cubes
or in its pure liquid form, including the weight of the carrier me-
dium is not consistent with Congress' definition of culpability.' 00
Furthermore, the weight of the LSD itself is slight compared to
the average weight of the blotter paper upon which it is carried.' 0 '
Thus, sentences based on the majority's approach in Chapman will
be based primarily on the weight of a substance which bears no rela-
tionship to the quantity of LSD a trafficker might distribute, but
which may have a dramatic effect on the offender's sentence. 10 2 The
petitioners in Chapman, for example, distributed 1000 doses of LSD
on blotter paper which resulted in a five year mandatory minimum
97 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Judge Posner illustrates the
point as follows: "Two quarts of 50 proof alcoholic beverage are more than one quart of
a 100-proof beverage, though the total alcohol content is the same. But a quart of or-
ange juice containing one dose of LSD is not more, in any relevant sense, than a pint of
juice containing the same one dose, and it would be loony to punish the purveyor of the
quart more heavily than the purveyor of the pint." United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d
1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd sub noma. Chapman v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
98 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1922.
99 The majority opinion in Chapman reproduced the following chart prepared by the
petitioners to illustrate potential sentencing disparity:
Weight of Base Offense Guidelines
Carrier 100 Doses Level Range (Months)
Suger Cube 227 gr. 36 188-235
Blotter Paper 1.4 gr. 26 63-78
Gelatin Capsule 225 mg. 18 27-33
Pure LSD 5 Mg. 12 10-16
Id. at 1924.
100 See Kallam, supra note 91, at 1279-80.
101 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1932 (Stevens,J. dissenting) (citing United States v. Marshall,
908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting)). For example, 100 doses of pure
LSD weighs approximately 5 mg., whereas the same 100 doses on the blotter paper used
by the petitioners in Chapman weighed 1.4 grams-280 times heavier than the pure LSD.
102 See Kallam, supra note 91, at 1280-81.
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sentence. 10 3 However, if the petitioners had distributed that same
1000 doses in pure liquid form they would have been subject only to
a sentence of between 15 and 21 months in prison.10 4 In fact, even
if the petitioners had sold 19,999 doses in pure form rather than
1000 doses on blotter paper, they still would not have been subject
to a five year mandatory minimum sentence. 0 5
Although the majority conceded that under its approach, "dis-
tributors of varying degrees of culpability might be subject to the
same sentence,"' 0 6 the Court argued that this will not occur often
because "blotter paper seems to be the carrier of choice, and the
vast majority of cases will therefore do exactly what the sentencing
scheme was designed to do-punish more heavily those who deal in
larger amounts of drugs." 0
7
The majority failed to recognize, however, that even the weight
of blotter paper varies considerably. For instance, in United States v.
Rose, 10 8 the defendant sold 472 doses of LSD on blotter paper which
weighed 7.3 grams. 10 9 In contrast, the defendants in Chapman sold
1000 doses on blotter paper that weighed only 5.7 grams. I 0 The
Sentencing Guidelines impose a sentence of between 97 and 121
months for distribution of 7.3 grams of LSD and a sentence of be-
tween 87 and 108 months for distribution of 5.7 grams.I' As a re-
sult, the defendant in Rose was punished more severely than the
defendants in Chapman even though the defendants in Chapman pos-
sessed twice as many doses of LSD.
Therefore, even among offenders who use blotter paper,
sentences imposed under Chapman will not uniformly be based on
culpability because offenders dealing in the same amount of LSD
might receive different sentences due simply to variations in the
weight of the blotter paper. 112 The Court nonetheless reasoned
103 Chapman, I I I S. Ct. at 1922-23.
104 One thousand doses multiplied by the average dose of 0.05 mg. per dose equals
50 mg. which yields a base offense level of 14. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1(c)(15) (Nov. 1992). Base offense level 14 corresponds to
a sentence of between 15 and 21 months for an offender in criminal history category I.
U.S.S.G., Sentencing Table.
105 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1924 n. 2. Although 19,999 doses seems quite high, part
IV.B. will show that the a quantity of cocaine equal to the weight of 19,999 doses of LSD
might yield between 325,000 and five million doses of cocaine. See infra Part IV.B.
106 Chapman, I11 S. Ct. at 1929.
107 Id. at 1928.
108 881 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1989).
109 Id.
110 Chapman, Ill S. Ct. at 1923.
"I See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2DI.I(c)(7),
(8) & Sentencing Table (Nov. 1992).
112 It might be argued that the approach taken by the majority in fact promotes uni-
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that blotter paper is a "tool of the trade" which facilitates the distri-
bution of LSD, and therefore, "it was rational for Congress to set
penalties based on this chosen tool.' 1 3 The majority furtherjusti-
fied its interpretation by noting that LSD distributors can minimize
their sentences by choosing lighter carrier mediums." 14
The majority's approach will not necessarily punish more se-
verely those offenders who sell larger quantities of LSD, but will
punish more severely those offenders who sell LSD on more weighty
carriers." 5 The major flaw in the majority's approach is that it ef-
fectively deters only the use of heavy carrier mediums, not the distri-
bution of larger amounts of LSD. The Court's holding encourages
the use of lightweight carrier mediums which will have the practical
effect of permitting larger numbers of doses to be sold under each
base offense level in the Guidelines. This is certainly contrary to the
intent of Congress, which enacted 21 U.S.C. § 841 to punish high
volume drug dealers more severely." 6 Furthermore, as the weight
of the blotter paper does not increase the price, quantity, or potency
of LSD, the majority's interpretation of "mixture or substance" de-
stroys any relationship between the punishment and culpability of
LSD offenders. Therefore, the majority approach undermines the
"just punishment" and "uniformity" goals embodied in the Sen-
tencing Guidelines."
17
B. LSD OFFENDERS WILL NOT RECEIVE PROPORTIONAL SENTENCES
UNDER THE COURT'S APPROACH
This section demonstrates that the Court's analysis in Chapman
not only fails to relate punishments to culpability, but also violates
the Sentencing Guidelines' goal of proportionality 1 8 when LSD
sentences are compared to sentences for other drugs. For instance,
a minimum of five kilograms of cocaine and a minimum of ten grams
formity because offenders who possess equal weights of LSD and blotter paper will in
fact receive the same sentence in all federal courts. This argument confuses procedure
with substance. Any non-discretionary procedure for calculating sentence, if uniformly
applied, will result in the same sentences for LSD offenders. This comment argues that
the procedure utilized by the Court is itself incorrect because it fails to adequately relate
criminal punishments to criminal culpability. However, Part IV will also demonstrate
that lower federal courts have not even been able to apply the Court's procedure in a
uniform manner.
113 Chapman, I l1 S. Ct. at 1928.
114 Id. at 1928 n.6.
115 See Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1934 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 See supra Part II.B.
117 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
393
THOMASJ. MEIER
of LSD each constitute a level 32 offense.119 Five kilograms of co-
caine in 1988 was worth between $55,000 and $170,000 at whole-
sale prices. 120 In contrast, tens grams of LSD on blotter paper
yields approximately 1135 doses of LSD.' 2 1 The value of 1135
doses of LSD at wholesale prices of between 35 cents and a $1.50
per dose equals only $397.25 to $1702.50.122 As a result, an of-
fender caught with $400 worth of LSD may be subject to the same
sentence as an offender caught with $55,000 worth of cocaine.
Nonetheless, only one district court has concluded that Congress
and the Commission could not have intented such a disproportional
result.1
2 3
However, if the blotter paper is in fact excluded, as Justice Ste-
vens advocated, 24 a more proportional result is possible. For in-
stance, as noted earlier, the five kilograms of cocaine required to
achieve base offense level 32 was worth between $55,000 and
$170,000 in 1988.125 The ten grams of the pure LSD necessary to
achieve offense level 32 under Justice Stevens' approach equals
about 200,000 doses at 0.05 milligrams per dose. 126 At 35 cents to
$1.50 per dose, ten grams of pure LSD is worth between $70,000
and $300,000-a much more proportional result.
The Chapman dissent also focused on the disproportionately
larger number of doses that cocaine and heroin dealers would be
able to sell while still receiving the same sentence as an LSD dealer.
Justice Stevens noted that Mr. Marshall, a defendant in one of the
119 A level 32 offense carries a Guidelines range of 121-151 months (10.1-12.6 years)
in prison for an offender in criminal history category I. UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (c)(6) & Sentencing Table (Nov. 1992).
120 United States v. Healy, 729 F. Supp. 140, 143 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing NATIONAL
CONSUMERS COMMITrEE, THE NNICC REPORT 1988: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO
THE UNITED STATES 31 (1989)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 143-44. ("The Sentencing Commission did not intend that a person
caught with $1,000 worth of LSD would face the same sentence as one caught with
$100,000 worth of cocaine, especially considering the relative impacts of the two
drugs."). Regarding the relative impacts of the two drugs, the Healy court noted that
"while physical and psychological [dependence on cocaine] is known to occur, physical
dependence on LSD is not, and only a small fraction of LSD users become psychologi-
cally dependent." In addition, deaths do occur from cocaine overdose, but not from
LSD overdose. Id. (citing T. Cox ET AL., DRUGS, AND DRUG ABUSE: A REFERENCE TEXT
(1983)).
124 See Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1929-34 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
125 Healy, 729 F. Supp at 143 (citing NATIONAL CONSUMERS COMMITrEE, THE NNICC
REPORT 1988: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES 31 (1989)).
126 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2DI.I, com-
ment. (n. 11) (Nov. 1992).
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suits consolidated for appeal, was sentenced to twenty years in
prison for selling fewer than 12,000 doses of LSD on blotter pa-
per. 127 Justice Stevens asserted that such a severe sentence was in-
equitable because:
[To] receive a comparable sentence for selling heroin, Marshall would
have had to sell ten kilograms, which would yield between one and two
million doses. To receive a comparable sentence for selling cocaine he
would have had to sell fifty kilograms, which would yield anywhere
from 325,000 to five million doses. 128
The majority's interpretation of "mixture or substance" thus pun-
ishes LSD traffickers more severely than similarly situated cocaine
and heroin traffickers, even though the street value and total
number of doses sold by LSD traffickers may be considerably less
than that sold by the cocaine and heroin traffickers. This dispropor-
tionate result is contrary to the proportionality goal Congress
sought to achieve in the Sentencing Guidelines.129 As Justice Ste-
vens correctly noted, the Court's construction "will necessarily pro-
duce sentences that are so anomalous that they will undermine the
very uniformity that Congress sought to achieve when it adopted the
Sentencing Guidelines."' 30
C. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS
Although Chapman established that a typical combination of
LSD and blotter paper is a "mixture" under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and
section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, lower federal courts
have struggled to apply the Chapman principles to other drug combi-
nations. This section will demonstrate the continuing disparity in
drug offender sentencing practices by discussing the conflicting po-
sitions taken by the lower federal courts regarding the proper inter-
pretation of Chapman.
1. Literal Interpretations
This section will discuss opinions from several circuits which
adhere strictly to the Supreme Court's technical definition of mix-
ture. These circuits focus only on whether the particles of a drug
are intermingled with and difficult to distinguish from the non-drug
substance with which the drug is mixed. Such a literal approach
tends to result in counter-intuitive sentencing patterns that have
127 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1932 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
130 Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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even less connection between punishment and culpability than the
Court's opinion in Chapman.
The First Circuit developed its literal interpretation in United
States v. Mahecha-Onofre.13 1 In that case, Mahecha-Onofre unsuccess-
fully attempted to evade customs agents by chemically bonding co-
caine to several suitcases.' 3 2 The district court imposed a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A),
based on the weight of the cocaine and the suitcase material (12
kilograms), instead of the weight of the cocaine itself (2.5
kilograms). 1
33
On appeal, the First Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's
definition of mixture, and its application to LSD and blotter paper,
applied equally to the cocaine and suitcase material.' 34 The court
recognized that, unlike blotter paper or cutting agents, the suitcase
material must be removed before the cocaine can be ingested, but
did not believe "this fact alone can make a difference to the out-
come, for 'ingestion' would not seem to play a critical role in the
definition of 'mixture' or 'substance'. "135 Therefore, the court held
the suitcase/cocaine combination fit the definition of "mixture" as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chapman and the appellant's
sentence was affirmed.'
36
131 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991).
132 Id. at 624.
133 Id. at 625. The defendant was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), see supra
note 51 for text of statute, and sentenced under § 841(b) (1) (a) which provides: "In the
case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving-(ii) 5 kilograms or more of
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of-(II) cocaine...; such person
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years ......
21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6) assigns a base offense
level of 32 for trafficking in "[a]t least 5 KG but less than 15 KG of Cocaine." UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1(c)(6) (Nov. 1992). Of-
fense level 32 corresponds to a sentence between 121 and 151 months for an offender in
criminal history category I. Id. at Sentencing Table.
134 Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625-26.
135 Id. at 626.
136 Id. Several other First Circuit decisions have adopted this literal approach to sen-
tencing drug offenders. In United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 955 (1992), the court held that the weight of beeswax stat-
ues containing cocaine was properly included with the weight of cocaine in calculating
the total weight of the controlled substance for purposes of establishing the base offense
level under the Sentencing Guidelines.
In United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484
(1992), the court held that the weight of fiberglass suitcase material containing cocaine
was properly included with the weight of cocaine for sentencing purposes. Dissenting
from the First Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Brown urged the First Cir-
cuit to overturn its Mahecha-Onofre decision. United States v. Lopez-Gil, No. 90-2059,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 10204, at *7 (1st Cir. May 12, 1992). He argued that "[c]arrier
mediums that cannot be digested, inhaled or otherwise consumed, but still significantly
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The Fifth Circuit has taken a similar approach.' 3 7 In United
States v. Sherrod,13 8 the defendants were convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine with intent to distribute.' 3 9 They argued that
drug enforcement agents interrupted the manufacturing process
and that the 17.5 kilogram mixture in their possession would have
produced much less actual methamphetamine had it been given
time to fully react. 140 Nonetheless, the district court based the de-
fendants' sentences on 17.5 kilograms of a "mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine."' 14 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that "pure" metha-
mphetamine and mixtures containing methamphetamine are ex-
pressly distinguished in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and
841(b) (1) (B) (viii) which provide the same penalty for a small
amount of "pure" methamphetamine and a comparatively larger
amount of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of methamphetamine."' 42 The court also emphasized the Supreme
Court did not intend its market-oriented analysis to apply to
methamphetamine since the Court established its market-oriented
analysis after expressly distinguishing the treatment of LSD from
increase the weight of the controlled substance, have no place in drastically affecting the
number of years a person must serve in prison." Id.
Finally, in United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992), the court held
that the gross weight of LSD impregnated blotter paper and the gross weight of LSD
bearing liquid were properly included in the total weight of LSD for sentencing pur-
poses. As the appellant pointed to no evidence that the 5.7 grams of LSD bearing liquid
(apparently water) was an unusual or heavy carrier medium within which to mix LSD,
the court concluded the liquid did not fall under the possible exception in Chapman for
very heavy carriers containing very little LSD. Id. at 131.
137 The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that in calculating the defendant's base of-
fense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the district court properly included the weight of a
liquid waste substance containing small amounts of methamphetamine. See, e.g., United
States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1993); United
States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 82 (1990); United States v. Baker, 883 F.2d 13
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
138 964 F.2d 1501 (5th Cir. 1992).
139 Id. at 1501. The defendants were convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). See
supra note 51 for the full text of § 841(a).
140 Id. at 1506.
141 Id. at 1503. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) provides: "In the case of a violation of subsection
(a) of this section involving-(viii) . .. 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine ... such person shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years .... " 21 U.S.C. § 841
(1988 & Supp. III 1991). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) assigns a base level of 36 for trafficking
in "[a]t least 10 KG but less than 30 KG of Methamphetamine." UNITED STATES SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1992). Level 36 corresponds
to a sentence between 188 and 235 months for an offender in criminal history category
I. Id. at Sentencing Table.
142 Sherrod, 964 F.2d at 1510.
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methamphetamine in Chapman.'43 Thus, the court held the entire
mixture was properly considered for sentencing purposes.
144
The Ninth Circuit considered a similar combination of
methamphetamine and poisonous by-products in United States v. Bel-
tran-Felix. 145 In that case, the court relied on the plain language of
the statute to reject the appellant's argument that only the
methamphetamine present should be weighed for sentencing pur-
poses. Because "the statute conspicuously does not say 100 grams of
a 'marketable mixture,' " the court held that the defendant's 192
gram amphetamine solution, "falls within the statute's terms." The
court also decided that no "language in the legislative history...
requires us to read the phrase 'a mixture or substance' to mean 'a
[readily marketable] mixture or substance.' ",146
2. Ingestibility/Marketability Interpretations
In contrast to those circuits which focus narrowly on Chapman's
definition of "mixture" or the technical language of the statute, the
circuits in this section favor an approach aimed at effectuating the
underlying purposes of the Guidelines within the parameters of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Chapman. As a result, these circuits in-
terpret Chapman to include an ingestibility or marketability require-
ment. Such an approach, although unable to address the LSD and
blotter paper inequity, is a positive step toward linking Guidelines
punishments more closely to culpability.
The Eleventh Circuit first imposed an ingestibility requirement
in United States v. Rolande-Gabriel. 147 The defendant in that case pled
guilty to importing cocaine. 148 The district court based its sentence
on the gross weight of the liquid in which the defendant attempted
to conceal the cocaine. 149 Although the total weight of the liquid
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1511.
145 934 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 955 (1992).
146 Id. at 1076. The Tenth Circuit has also consistently held that the weight of a mix-
ture may include waste products from the manufacturing process. See, e.g., United States
v. Hood, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1928 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992); United States v. Dor-
rough, 927 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462 (10th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Larsen, 904 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct.
2800 (1991).
147 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
148 Id. at 1232. The appellant pled guilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a)(1) and
960(a)(1).
149 The total quantity was not sufficient to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12) imposes a base offense level of 20
for trafficking in "[a]t least 200 G but less than 300 G of Cocaine." UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2Dl.1 (Nov. 1992). Level 20 corre-
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was 241.6 grams, only 7.2 grams of cocaine and 65 grams of cutting
agent were present.15 0
In reversing the appellant's sentence, the Eleventh Circuit
opined that strict adherence to the Sentencing Commission's intent
to give the term "mixture" the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (b) would result in the inclusion of all mixtures for sentencing
purposes, because § 841(b) does not differentiate between types of
mixtures. 51 The court rejected such a "hypertechnical and
mechanical application of the statutory language" in favor of inter-
preting "mixture" in relation to the purposes behind the Sentencing
Guidelines.
15 2
Unlike the First Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
marketable and ingestible nature of the LSD and blotter paper in
Chapman, as distinguished from the liquid and cocaine combination
used by Rolande-Gabriel. 153 The court emphasized that the LSD
considered by the Supreme Court was "usable, consumable, and
ready for wholesale or retail distribution when placed on standard
carrier mediums, such as blotter paper . . . [whereas] the cocaine
mixture in this case was obviously unusable while mixed with the
liquid." 154
Noting that the Supreme Court determined inclusion of the
weight of standard carrier mediums was rational because such carri-
ers facilitate the use and marketing of LSD, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the liquid waste failed to fulfill such a function. 155
The court analogized the liquid more closely to a "packaging mate-
rial" because it was easily distinguished from the cocaine and cut-
ting agent.' 5 6 Therefore, the court restricted its interpretation of
"mixture or substance" to "drug mixtures which are usable in the
chain of distribution." 15
7
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States
sponds to a sentence of between 33 and 41 months for an offender in criminal history
category I. Id. at Sentencing Table.
150 Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1233.
151 Id. at 1235.
152 Id.




157 Id. See also United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding dis-
trict court improperly included weight of liquid (wine) in which cocaine was suspended);
United States v. Robins, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14296 (9th Cir. June 24, 1992) (holding




v. Acosta. 158 In that case the court held that the weight of creme
liqueur in which 2.245 kilograms of cocaine was dissolved should
not be included in calculating the defendant's base offense level. 159
As opposed to the LSD in Chapman, the Second Circuit found the
"mixture" to be useless for distribution at the wholesale or retail
level because the cocaine could not be ingested or mixed with cut-
ting agents until the creme liqueur was removed.
160
The Second Circuit looked to Congressional intent to support
its exclusion of the unusable portion of the mixture. The court de-
termined Congress was most concerned with consumable mixtures
which will reach the streets.
Viewed through a market-oriented prism, there is no difference in cul-
pability between individuals bringing the identical amount and purity
of drugs to market but concealing the drugs in different amounts of
unusable mixtures .... Sentencing these individuals differently...
would also fly in the face of the fundamental underpinnings of the
Guidelines, namely, uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.
161
In dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland criticized the majority for
reading an "ingestibility" requirement into § 841. First, he noted
that the creme liqueur/cocaine mixture was in fact ingestible.
162
Second, he noted that Congress adjusted the drug trafficking penal-
ties to punish "big-time traffickers in drugs" and to focus on the
manner in which such traffickers distribute their products. He
therefore believed the ingestibility of the product moving along the
chain of distribution was irrelevant. 163 The Second Circuit has not
thus far adopted Judge Van Graafeiland's position.
164
Finally, the Sixth Circuit relied on a "market-oriented" ap-
proach to reverse a sentence based on 4180 grams of a mixture con-
taining only 1.67% methamphetamine in United States v. Jennings.165
158 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992).
159 Id. at 552. The total weight of the creme liqueur and cocaine combined equalled
4.662 kilograms. Id. That quantity did not trigger a mandatory minimum sentence
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1(c)(7) imposes offense level 30 for "[a]t least
3.5 KG but less than 5 KG of Cocaine." UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1992). Level 30 corresponds to a sentence between
97-121 months for an offender in criminal history category I. Id. at Sentencing Table.
160 Acosta, 963 F.2d at 555.
161 Id. at 554.
162 Id. at 558 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 559-561 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Salgado-Molina, 967 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding dis-
trict court improperly included weight of alcohol that was mixed with cocaine in calculat-
ing net weight of the drug because the alcohol made the mixture uningestible and,
therefore, unmarketable).
165 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991), opinion clarified by 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992). 21
U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (b) states: "In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section
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In that case the appellant was interrupted in the process of "cook-
ing" methamphetamine. He argued if the chemicals had been al-
lowed to react the final product would have weighed considerably
less.' 66 Unlike the Ninth Circuit,' 67 the Jennings court relied on
Chapman's interpretation of Congressional intent 68 to conclude dis-
tributors who dilute their drugs to increase the amount available for
sale to consumers should be subject to punishment for the entire
weight of the mixture. However, the court distinguished the
methamphetamine mixture inJennings because "the defendants were
not attempting to increase the amount of methamphetamine they
had available to sell by adding a dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier
medium, but rather were attempting to distill methamphetamine
from the otherwise uningestible byproducts of its manufacture."'' 69
Thus, the Sixth Circuit found section 2D1.1 did not warrant
punishing the defendants for the entire weight of the
methamphetamine mixture when "they could have neither pro-
duced that amount of methamphetamine nor distributed the mix-
ture containing methamphetamine."' 70 The case was remanded to
the district court with directions to determine the amount of
methamphetamine that could have been manufactured.' 7'
3. These Conflicting Interpretations Create Disparity
As the preceding sections illustrate, the federal courts have
been unable to establish a consistent interpretation of "mixture or
substance." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has yet to grant certio-
rai in order to clarify its stance in Chapman.172 Under the present
involving-(viii) ... 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detecta-
ble amount of methamphetamine... such person shall be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment which may not be less than 5 years." 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 imposes a base offense level of 28 for trafficking in "[a]t least 400 G
but not less than 700 G of Methamphetamine." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.I. Level 28 corre-
sponds to a sentence between 78 and 97 months for an offender in criminal history
category I. Id. at Sentencing Table.
166 Jennings, 945 F.2d at 134.
167 See United States v. Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 955 (1992). See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text for a complete discussion
of the case.
168 "Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier medium to be
included in the weight of those drugs for sentencing purposes." United States v. Chap-
man, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1924 (1991).
169 Jennings, 945 F.2d at 137.
170 Id. at 136.
171 The court did, however, note that it was possible for the appellants to receive the
same sentence on remand because the court might impose an upward departure for
drug purity. Id.
172 However, in Fowner v. United States, 947 F.2d 954 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1998 (1992),Justice White dissented from the Court's refusal to grant certiorari. In
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state of conflict in the law, offenders in different jurisdictions receive
disparate sentences based upon the same criminal conduct.
In order to illustrate this disparity, consider the case of Luis
Mahecha-Onofre, the defendant in United States v. Mahecha-Onofre. 173
He possessed 2.5 kilograms of cocaine which was chemically bonded
to a suitcase weighing 9.5 kilograms. 174 Relying on Chapman's tech-
nical definition of "mixture," the First Circuit determined that the
cocaine/suitcase combination was a mixture for sentencing pur-
poses equalling 12 kilograms. 75 The Guidelines impose a Level 32
sentence of between 121 and 151 months for distribution of that
quantity of cocaine. 176 The First Circuit sentenced Mahecha-Onofre
to 146 months in prison. 177
However, had Mahecha-Onofre been convicted and sentenced
in the Second, Sixth or Eleventh Circuit, the weight of the suitcase
material would have been discarded as not marketable or ingest-
ible.' 78 Therefore, only the 2.5 kilograms of cocaine would have
been weighed for sentencing purposes.' 79 The weight of 2.5 kilo-
grams of cocaine corresponds to a Level 28 sentence of between 78
and 97 months.18 0 As a result, Mahecha-Onofre received a sentence
between 49 and 68 months (4 to 5.6 years) longer by being sen-
tenced in the First Circuit as opposed to being sentenced in the Sec-
ond or Eleventh Circuits.' 8 ' Until this interpretational conflict is
resolved, drug offenders engaging in identical criminal conduct will
that case, the petitioner appealed his sentence based on 24 gallons of liquid waste con-
taining a small amount of methamphetamine. The issue was whether "the weight of
uningestible waste material should be included in calculating the weight of a 'mixture or
substance.' " Id. at 1999. Justice White would have granted certiorari because "identical
conduct in violation of the same federal laws may give rise to widely disparate sentences
in different areas of the country." Id. at 2000.
173 936 F.2d 623 (lst Cir. 1991). Seesupra notes 131-36 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the case.
174 Id. at 625.
175 Id. at 625-26.
176 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2DI.1(c)(6)
& Sentencing Table (Nov. 1992).
177 Mahecha, 936 F.2d at 624.
178 See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992) (uningestible mate-
rial not part of "mixture or substance"); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d. 129 (6th
Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991)
(unusable or uningestible material not part of "mixture or substance").
179 Acosta, 936 F.2d at 556-57.
180 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(8) & Sentencing Table.
181 Mahecha-Onofre was also subject to the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence
under the First Circuit's interpretation, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. III
1991), but would have only been subject to the five-year mandatory sentence, see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), under the Second, Sixth, or Eleventh Circuit's interpretation.
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continue to receive disparate sentences based solely on the jurisdic-
tion within which they are sentenced.
Although the discretion of the federal judges has supposedly
been limited by the Sentencing Guidelines, 8 2 the resulting limita-
tion, as demonstrated, has not produced uniform sentencing prac-
tices. The disparity resulting from conflicting interpretations of
"mixture or substance" undermines the very purpose for which the
Sentencing Guidelines were adopted-the promotion of uniform
federal sentencing practices.'l 3
V. A PROPOSAL FOR PRINCIPLED REFORM
This section proposes an alternative construction for interpret-
ing "mixture or substance" in light of the inconsistencies created by
Chapman. This section then demonstrates how the proposed con-
struction links the sentences of LSD offenders more closely to crimi-
nal culpability and provides a clearer framework for lower courts to
follow. Because they require modifications in § 841 and section
2D1.1, the proposals in this section are primarily directed to Con-
gress or the Sentencing Commission. 8 4
This Comment suggests the following three-prong test to de-
termine which combinations of drug and non-drug substances
should be considered a "mixture" under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and
U.S.S.G. section 2D 1.1. Under this test, the weight of a mixture or
substance shall include the weight of the pure drug plus the weight
of any non-drug substance only if the following conditions are met:
(1) The substance cannot be easily distinguished or separated from
the pure drug;
(2) the substance is commonly ingested with the pure drug by street
market level consumers; and
(3) the substance dilutes the pure drug in order to increase the total
182 See supra Part II.A.
183 "The [Sentencing Reform Act] creates a sentencing guidelines system that is in-
tended to treat all classes of offenses committed by all categories of offenders consist-
ently." S. Rep. No. 222, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1983).
184 Congress obviously has the power to amend the penalty scheme contained in
§ 841 at any time. See U.S. CONST. art. I. The Sentencing Commission itself has also
been established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing practices in the federal
courts. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 1, Pt.A, in-
tro. comment (Nov. 1992). Although the Commission cannot change the language of a
statute, it does have the power to submit amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to
Congress each year between the beginning of a regular congressional session and May
1. Id. "Such amendments automatically take effect 180 days after submission unless a
law is enacted to the contrary." Id. In fact, the Commission has emphasized that it
expects continuing experience and analysis to result in "modifications and revisions of
the guidelines through submission of amendments to Congress." Id.
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quantity of the drug available for distribution at the street market
level.
All three elements must be present in order to include the weight of
the non-drug substance. 185
Element number one is taken from the Chapman opinion itself
and, like Chapman, excludes the weights of containers and other
packaging materials which are clearly not "mixed or otherwise com-
bined with the pure drug."' 18 6 As a result, a glass vial containing
LSD would be excluded by a judge applying element one because
the glass vial can easily be separated and distinguished from LSD. 187
Thus, element one essentially excludes drug and non-drug combi-
nations which are not in fact mixtures at all because the "particles of
one are [not] diffused among the particles of the other."' 8 8
Element two draws upon and clarifies the Second, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits' interpretations of the Chapman opinion. 189 As
suggested by those circuits, element two excludes any non-drug
substance which is not ingestible. 190 As a result, the suitcase mate-
rial which was mixed with cocaine in United States v. Mahecha-
Onofre' 9 1 would not be weighed because it is not ingestible. The
poisonous by-products of the methamphetamine manufacturing
185 A repeal of the mandatory minimum sentence provisions in § 841 would further
promote the relationship between punishments and culpability. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),
(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Although not directly related to the interpretation of mix-
ture or substance, the mandatory sentences inhibit the ability of federal judges to make
adjustments for factors that even a revised construction of mixture or substance cannot
anticipate. See Hon. Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 786 (1992). The Federal Courts Study Committee recom-
mends that these mandatory minimum sentences be repealed. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY CoMMiTrEE 133-34 (1990).
The mandatory sentences have also placed an artificial structure on § 2D1.1 be-
cause the Commission graded sentences upward and downward using the quantity of
drugs in the mandatory minimum sentences as guideposts. See supra Part II.B. As a
result, the mandatory minimums contribute to sentencing practices which do not ade-
quately relate the punishment to criminal culpability. In addition, a recent study sug-
gests that mandatory minimum sentences are contributing to overcrowding in an
already overcrowded federal prison system. See Karle & Sager, supra note 12, at 393.
This result is contrary to the intent of Congress which directed the Commission to take
into account the capacity of the penal system when formulating the Guidelines. See 28
U.S.C. § 994(g).
186 See Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1926.
187 Id. The Chapman majority indicated in dictum that it would exclude the glass vial
on these grounds. Id.
188 Id. The Chapman Court's dictionary definition of "mixture," see supra note 62 and
accompanying text, could be applied to decide whether a drug and non-drug combina-
tion satisfies element one.
189 See supra Part IV.C.2.
190 See supra Part IV.C.2.
191 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991). See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the case.
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process would also be excluded on the same grounds.19 2 If, as in
United States v. Jennings,193 the manufacturing process is interrupted,
the weight of the total quantity of ingestible methamphetamine that
could be produced, rather than the weight of the poisonous ingredi-
ents at the time of interruption, should be used. The end product is
ingestible, whereas the poisonous ingredients are not. 194
However, element two further requires that the non-drug sub-
stance normally be consumed with the pure drug at the street level.
This clarification responds to Judge Van Graafeiland's dissent in
United States v. Acosta.' 95 He noted that the creme liqueur/cocaine
mixture in that case was in fact ingestible. 196 Unlike the majority
opinion in Acosta, which held the mixture was not ingestible, 197 a
judge applying element two could concede such a mixture is ingest-
ible, but not normally ingested by a street level consumer. Thus,
the judge will reach the same result as the Acosta majority without
engaging in the fiction that a liqueur/cocaine mixture is not
ingestible.
Element three departs from the position taken by the Chapman
Court. It distinguishes between cutting agents that dilute the pure
drug in order to increase the amount of the drug available to the
consumer, and carrier mediums that simply facilitate distribution of
the pure drug. Thus, element three differs from Chapman'98 in that
a judge applying element three would only weigh the pure LSD, not
the blotter paper upon which the LSD was placed, because the blot-
ter paper itself does not increase the amount of LSD that can be
distributed to consumers. 199
However, element three would not exclude the typical cutting
agents used to dilute drugs like cocaine and heroin. Unlike blotter
paper upon which a dose of LSD is placed, cutting agents like man-
nitol actually increase the amount of cocaine available to the ulti-
mate consumer.200 Once a dose of LSD is placed on blotter paper,
it remains a dose and is not further diluted by adding additional
192 See United States v. Fowner, 947 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1998 (1992).
193 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the case.
194 TheJennings Court reached the same conclusion using a similar analysis. SeeJen-
nings, 945 F.2d at 129.
195 963 F.2d 551, 557-561 (2d Cir. 1992) (Van Graafeiland,J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 558 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 551.
198 The majority held that the weight of the blotter paper should be included with the
weight of the pure LSD. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
199 See supra Part IV.A.
200 See Kallam, supra note 91, at 1279.
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blotter paper. 20' However, cutting agents can be added to cocaine
or heroin at every level in the distribution chain to further dilute
those drugs and increase the number of consumers to whom those
drugs can be distributed. 20 2
For example, one gram of pure cocaine might yield anywhere
from 6.5 to 100 diluted doses of cocaine at the street level. 20 3
Under the three-prong test, a dealer in possession of 100 heavily
diluted doses of cocaine would receive a more severe punishment
than the dealer with 6.5 purer doses even though both possess the
same one gram. The sentence will be more severe because the
larger quantity of cutting agents necessary to achieve 100 doses will
increase the weight of the cocaine for sentencing purposes.
This approach is consistent with Congress' definition of culpa-
bility because the cutting agents themselves were necessary to in-
crease the number of doses. As a result, they played a vital role in
the ability of the dealer selling 100 doses to keep the street market
going longer than the dealer selling 6.5 doses. 204
Although the three prong test attempts to tie punishments
closer to culpability, the system is not perfect. For instance, the ac-
tual amount of LSD in one dose may vary from the 0.05 milligram
dose established by the Sentencing Guidelines. 20 5 If the weight of
the blotter paper is excluded under these circumstances, and only
the pure LSD is weighed, punishments still might not relate exactly
to culpability. For instance, a dealer who sells 0.025 milligram
doses of LSD, as opposed to a dealer who sells 1 milligram doses of
LSD, could conceivably reach more consumers even though both
dealers begin with the same quantity of pure LSD. Nonetheless,
both dealers will receive the same sentence because each possesses
the same pure quantity of LSD.20 6
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 The figures in this example are based upon figures in Chapman v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 1919, 1932 n.12 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
204 See H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12 (1986). See supra Part IV.A for
a discussion of Congress' definition of culpability.
205 See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1315-16 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'dsub nom.
Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
206 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (Nov.
1992). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that Senators Biden and Kennedy each in-
troduced amendments that would simply exclude the weight of "carrier mediums" such
as blotter paper. See 135 Cong. Rec. S12, 748 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Biden); 136 Cong. Rec. S70, 69-70 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy). Senator Biden's amendment was adopted as part of Amendment No. 976 to S.
1711, but that amendment never passed the House of Representatives. Chapman v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1931 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Including the weight of the blotter paper for sentencing pur-
poses, however, is not an adequate response to this problem be-
cause the blotter paper itself does not increase the amount of LSD
available to consumers. 20 7 The LSD is increased by cutting the blot-
ter paper into smaller squares or applying smaller doses of LSD to
the blotter paper.208 As a result, sentences for LSD and other drugs
sold by the dose should be based upon the actual number of doses
possessed by a drug offender.
The legislative history of the Drug Abuse Act states only that
Congress "has not generally related [drug] quantities to the number
of doses." 209 Thus, it would not be completely inconsistent with
Congress' previous intent to punish LSD offenders by the dose. In
fact, the approach would be consistent with Congress' treatment of
drugs like cocaine, which are sold by weight. Like cocaine punish-
ments, LSD offenders punished on the basis of the number of doses
in their possession would be punished on the basis of their ability to
"keep the street markets going" rather than on the basis of drug
purity. 210 Thus, a dealer in possession of more doses, regardless of
the quantity of LSD in each dose, will be punished more severely.2 1'
This approach would also be easier to administer than the cur-
rent weight-based system. The actual number of squares (doses of
LSD) can be counted on a sheet of blotter paper.2 12 Thus, the test-
ing required to separate the pure LSD from the blotter paper would
only be necessary when the total number of doses cannot be accu-
rately counted. In such cases, the Sentencing Guidelines have al-
ready established an average dose at 0.05 milligrams. 213 Thus, the
pure LSD could be weighed and divided by 0.05 in order to deter-
mine the number of doses available. 214
Finally, the promulgation of sentences based upon the number
of doses should not be too difficult. The weights of existing quanti-
ties of LSD already set out in the Guidelines could simply be divided
by 0.05 in order to determine the appropriate dosage levels. 215
207 See supra Part IV.A.
208 See supra Part IV.A.
209 H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12 (1986) (emphasis added).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 In Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991), the Court noted that once
LSD is placed upon blotter paper, the paper is cut into one dose squares. Id. at 1923.
213 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D 1.1 (11) (Nov.
1992).
214 If the total number of doses, but not the quantity is known, the Guidelines pres-
ently direct the judge to multiply the number of doses by 0.05 mg. in order to determine
the quantity. Id.
215 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
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Then adjustments could be made if necessary to reflect any addi-
tional Congressional concerns.
It might be argued the approach taken in this section will not
provide a clearer framework for the courts to follow. Certainly, a
list of substances which should be excluded or included in the
weight of a controlled substance for sentencing purposes could be
developed. However, the three-prong test provides a more flexible
system that can adjust to future changes in drug distribution pat-
terns, while at the same time clarifying the existing conflicts among
the circuits.
Another possible criticism of the alternatives suggested by this
section is that they do not adequately differentiate between high vol-
ume dealers and drug couriers.2 16 For instance, a drug courier fre-
quently does not know the value, type, or amount of a drug that he
or she has been hired to carry. 217 Nor would such a person be con-
sidered a high volume trafficker at the wholesale or market level. 21 8
Nonetheless, the courier's punishment will normally be based on
the quantity of drugs possessed, in the same fashion as a high vol-
ume retail dealer. 219 Although the issue is important, the argument
is more appropriately addressed to a modification of the minor par-
ticipant provisions in the Guidelines, rather than a modification of
the mixture or substance interpretation.
A final criticism of any approach which requires separation of a
mixture into component substances for sentencing purposes is that
such testing will be an undue burden on the courts.220 This criti-
cism is without merit. First, in all the cases analyzed in this Com-
ment, the courts separated mixtures into drug and non-drug
substances. Thus, separating the mixture appears to be common
practice. 22' Second, the proposed alternative sentencing scheme
should actually ease the administrative burden of sentencing LSD
traffickers. In a majority of these cases the pure LSD would not have
to be extracted because the court could count the number of
squares (doses) of LSD.
216 Albert Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58
U. Cm. L. REV. 901, 921 (1991).
217 Id.
218 See H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12 (1986).
219 Alschuler, supra note 216, at 921; Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission "s Drug
Guidelines: Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENT. Ru'rR. 63 (Sept.-
Oct. 1990).
220 United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1324 (7th Cir. 1990).
221 Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1333 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
408 [Vol. 84
1993] "MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE" INTERPRETATION
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the proposed three-prong test and the modifica-
tion in LSD sentencing procedure proposed in this Comment would
establish a closer relationship between punishments and criminal
culpability than existing practices. As explained in Part IV.A., when
Congress passed the Drug Abuse Act, it intended to relate criminal
culpability to the quantity of drugs which a trafficker can distribute
to consumers at the street level. Unlike the Chapman approach, the
three-prong test excludes substances that currently have a drastic
effect on the weight of the mixture, even though they are not in-
gested by the street level consumer and do not increase the number
of consumers to whom the drug can be sold. The proposed test,
however, does continue to include non-drug substances that are in-
distinguishable from the drug, are normally consumed with the drug
at the street level, and increase the number of consumers to whom
the drug can be distributed. LSD offenders will not receive lighter
treatment under the three-prong test because such offenders will be
punished by the number of doses which they could distribute, rather
than by the quantity of pure LSD. As a result of the three-prong
test, drug offenders will be more uniformly punished on the basis of
their true culpability-the quantity of the drug in their possession
which can affect the street market consumer-and the Sentencing
Guidelines will better achieve their intended purpose of promoting
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.
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